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NOTES & COMMENTS
CAN'T GET NO SATISFACTION: HOW ABKCO V. LA VERE
BOWED TO PRESSURE FROM THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
In copyright law, the moment of publication is crucial. Publication
occurs when an artist's work is distributed to the public.' It determines the
level of protection bestowed upon an artistic creation, which in turn
determines the value of the copyright itself.2 A controversial Supreme
Court decision relating to publication, on the issue of whether piano rolls
were a copy of the underlying work or merely a reproduced performance,3
helped prompt Congress to significantly revise the Copyright Act in 1909.
4
Congress's reaction illustrates the importance of the publication issue in
copyright law.
Since the contentious 1995 Ninth Circuit decision in La Cienega
Music Co. v. ZZ Top,5 the question of whether phonograph records
("phonorecords") distributed before 1978 are publications of the underlying
work has remained uncertain. In June 2000, the Ninth Circuit handed
down a decision in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere,6 resolving a split
between the Ninth and the Second Circuits that had caused a great deal of
controversy within the music recording industry.7 Congress ultimately
responded to this circuit split by amending the Copyright Act of 1909 (the
1. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.01 n. 1 (2000)
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2005 (2d ed. 1954).
2. See id. § 4.03.
3. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
4. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
5. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
6. 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000).
7. Compare Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the sale of phonorecords did not constitute
publication of the underlying work), with La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 (declining to follow
Rosette). All references to the Rosette decision are to the district court's published opinion as the
circuit court merely affirmed the district court's ruling without any relevant discussion of the
issues. 546 F.2d at 462-63.
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"1997 amendment"). 8 The Ninth Circuit justified its opinion by claiming
that the ABKCO decision restored copyright law to its position before the
Ninth Circuit's divisive decision in La Cienega.9  However, the
controversy over the rationale behind ABKCO still rages today.
Disputes over the ownership and use of music are nothing new.10 The
idea that musical artists influence and inspire each other with their
compositions is one of the cornerstones of creativity that helps to keep
music a fundamental way to express thoughts and feelings.1 Musicians, as
well as other artists, have always integrated some of the works of their
fellow artists into their own performances to create new and unique artistic
works.1 2  However, when musicians reproduce other artists' exact or
virtually exact works and pass them off as their own, the reproducing artist
risks infringing on the original artist's property rights.
13
The creation of technology to reproduce musical compositions in a
mechanical fashion to "perform" the underlying music immediately raised
questions about the copyright issues surrounding these reproductions.
14
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, 15 once an artist published a work for the
general public to see or hear, the general public could freely use the work,
unless the artist specifically sought its statutory protection. 6  This
protection traded rights between the artist and the government.17 The artist
promised to allow public use of the work in the future, and after publication
the government promised the artist a limited monopoly on the distribution
and subsequent profits from selling the work.
18
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, the work's publication date initiated
this limited monopoly. 19 Therefore, the determination of the date of
publication for works published before 1978, if the artist published the
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
9. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
10. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17.
11. Robert Johnson's works in particular have been a source of inspiration for many
subsequent artists. See, e.g., Robert Johnson, at http://www.blueflamecafe.con/
RobertJohnson.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2001).
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 684.
14. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17.
15. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
16. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.01[B].
17. See generally id.
18. Id. § 4.03. "On the one hand, the interest of authors in the fruits of their labor must be
preserved. At the same time, due regard must be given to the interest of the public in ultimately
claiming free access to the materials essential to the development of society." Id.
19. Brown v. Tabb, 714 F.2d 1088, 1092 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
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work at all, essentially determined the benefits accruing to the artist from
the public's use of the work.2° What can an artist do when using music
from a recording distributed before 1978 that he reasonably, but
erroneously, believed to be in the public domain because the music had no
federal statutory copyright protection?
This Note proposes that ABKCO, as well as the 1997 amendment to
the Copyright Act that precipitated ABKCO,21 are legal anomalies that
frustrate the intent of the Constitution. Additionally, ABKCO further
confuses the issue of publication of phonorecords published before 1978.
This Note will also examine the public policy reasons surrounding the 1909
Copyright Act regarding the publication issue, by following court
interpretations of this term over the last nine decades. Finally, this Note
will contemplate the repercussions of ABKCO on the future of copyright
jurisprudence in the music industry.
Part II of this Note provides a background on the relevant aspects of
the applicable law. Part III describes ABKCO's background, detailing the
facts preceding ABKCO at the district and circuit court levels. Part IV
analyzes the ABKCO parties' arguments on the issue of publication and
ultimately argues that the Circuit Court made the wrong decision. Part V
concludes with the potential impact of ABKCO and its relevance in the
jurisprudential history of copyright law in the United States.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND LAW
A. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.
22
White-Smith contemplated the copyright implications of the use of
piano rolls, one of the earliest music reproduction technologies.23 The
fundamental flaw in White-Smith 's reasoning was that the court primarily
compared copies of musical compositions to copies of literary
24compositions. At the time the ability to mechanically reproduce music
was a relatively new phenomenon 25 and the previous copyright law did not
address mechanical reproductions of music. 26 Instead, the copyright statute
limited its discussion of musical composition regulations to sheet music,
20. See, e.g., White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
22. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
23. See id. at 8-9.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 2.
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the only known way of reproducing music at that time.27
The court determined that because the piano rolls merely produced
sound instead of copies of the actual notes in the form of sheet music, piano
rolls were not copies of the original artist's work.28
B. The Copyright Act of 1909
The Copyright Act has undergone a number of amendments since its
revision in 1909.29 The United States Supreme Court interpreted the
Copyright Act of 1909 as proclaiming that mechanical recordings simply
reproduced "performances" of the underlying musical composition.30
Consequently, these recordings were not technically copies of the work and
therefore could not be copyrighted. 31 However, the sheet music (i.e., the
printed notes of the musical composition) could be copyrighted.32
Although the 1909 Copyright Act did not specifically define
"publication,, 33 the concept was an important factor in determining
whether statutory or common law copyright protection applied.34
C. The Publication Issue
The concept of "publication" in copyright law jurisprudence
underwent a number of changes over the last century. 35 When Congress
first added the term "musical composition" to federal copyright statutes in
1831, mechanical reproduction of music was literally inconceivable.36 The
issue of whether the distribution to the general public of such mechanical
reproductions constituted publication of the underlying work would
become one of the most important and divisive issues in the history of
copyright law.37
27. Id. at 12.
28. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 14.
29. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
30. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 565 (1973).
31. Id.
32. See id. at 566.
33. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.04 n.5. "Apparently a definition of publication was
intentionally omitted because of the difficulty of defining the term with respect to works of art
where no copies are reproduced." Id.
34. Id. § 4.01.
35. See id.
36. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 3-4.
37. See generally ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosette v.
Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ
Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
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The Copyright Act of 1909 failed to adequately define the term
"publication. ' 38  Apparently recognizing the confusion surrounding the
publication issue, legislators amended the Copyright Act of 1909 so that
the Copyright Act of 1976 no longer included the term to indicate the type
of copyright protection bestowed upon artistic works.39  Despite the
originally indistinct definition of "publication," case law over the years has
defined "publication" as follows:
[P]ublication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner,
the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned,
given away, or otherwise made available to the general public,
or when an authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in
any such manner, even if a sale or other such disposition does
not in fact occur.4°
Today, as we find ourselves in the midst of the information age, the
term "publication" has taken on an entirely new meaning.4' Posting music
on the Internet has allowed people worldwide access to these artistic
works.42 Although ABKCO involved actual phonorecords, the Copyright
Act provides that the term "phonorecord" generally includes other media
on which sound recordings are captured, including compact discs, audio
cassettes, and probably even digital computer files.43
As new and previously inconceivable methods of publication continue
to emerge, determining whether phonorecords distributed before 197844
constitute publications of the musical compositions embodied therein
remains a very important issue because of the potential impact on the rights
of thousands of artists who distributed phonorecords before 1978. 45
38. See Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
39. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.04 n.5.
40. Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 1 NIMMER,
supra note 1, § 4.04).
41. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.01.
42. See id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the material object in which
the sounds are first fixed.
Id.
44. The Copyright Act of 1976 took effect on January 1, 1978. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541, 2598 (1976).
45. 143 CONG. REC. H9883 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Bono) ("[La
Cienega] has jeopardized the private property rights for thousands of creative individuals who
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This publication issue caught the attention of the music industry in
1995, when the Ninth Circuit decided in La Cienega that the distribution of
phonorecords constituted a publication of the underlying music. 46  This
Ninth Circuit decision conflicted with an earlier decision in the Second
Circuit regarding the same issue.47 Not surprisingly, the music industry
agreed with the Second Circuit's decision that distribution and sale of
phonorecords did not constitute publication of the underlying music for
copyright purposes. 8 This idea of the effect of distribution and sale of
phonorecords was based upon the established practice of the industry.49 In
1997, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 to make it consistent
with the Rosette ruling.
50
ABKCO confirmed Congress' 1997 amendment, with the intent to
resolve the issue once and for all.51 However, strong evidence indicates
that both Congress and the Ninth Circuit bowed unnecessarily to pressure
from the music industry.52 The Ninth Circuit wrongly decided ABKCO,
rejecting the principle of stare decisis by overturning the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in La Cienega. La Cienega is the best interpretation of the 1909
Copyright Act and the best rule for public policy reasons.
D. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing Corp. 3
In 1973, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that the distribution of phonorecords did not constitute "publication"
of the underlying work.54  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently affirmed this ruling in 1976.55  The music industry
immediately embraced Rosette, which maintained that distribution of
phonorecords merely reproduced performances and thus were not
publications of the underlying musical compositions.
56
live within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.").
46. See generally La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953.
47. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193.
48. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 690 (quoting CONG. REC. H9882 (1997) (statement of Rep.
Berman)).
49. Id.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
51. See generally ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691-92.
52. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7] ("In response to that 1995 ruling [in La
Cienega], affected songwriters lobbied Congress for an amendment to the Copyright Act.").
53. 354 F. Supp. 1183.
54. Id. at 1193.
55. See Rosette, 546 F.2d at 463.
56. 143 CONG. REC. S 11, 301 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Rosette
comports with the nearly universal understanding of the music and sound recording industries and
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Essentially, Rosette held that artists could protect their music in two
ways.57 If the music was unpublished, state common law copyrights on
unpublished works protected the music until publication. 8  Once
published, proper notice and registration according to federal copyright
requirements protected the music. 59 Therefore, under Rosette, common law
copyrights protected music as an unpublished work when an artist who
distributed and sold phonorecords failed to give notice and file for federal
60copyright registration.
E. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top
61
In 1995 the Ninth Circuit handed down a decision that caused a
firestorm of controversy because it could have changed the rights of
thousands of artists.62  Contrary to Rosette, La Cienega ruled that
distribution of phonorecords did constitute "publication" under the
meaning of the Copyright Act of 1909.63 Under La Cienega, artists who
distributed a phonorecord but failed to comply with federal copyright
formalities, such as notice and registration, would see their work
immediately pass into the public domain, where anyone could freely use
the work without infringing on the artist's rights.64  Thus, under La
Cienega, an artist could potentially lose out on millions of dollars in
royalties that he or she would otherwise have received with proper notice
65
and registration for federal copyright protection.
F. The 1997 Amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909
In 1997, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909, as embodied
in the Copyright Act of 1976,66 to exempt all songs embodied in
of the Copyright Office.").
57. See Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1192.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. ld. at 1193.
61. 53 F.3d 950.
62. 143 CONG. REc. H9883 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The La
Cienega decision took that settled law [of Rosette] and cast it on its head, threatening to thrust
into the public domain hundreds of thousands of musical works which presently enjoy copyright
protection.").
63. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Reed Branson, Robert Johnson's Blues-Property Rights Law Suit Starts,
BLuESNEWS, at http://www.blues.co.nz/news/article.php?id=55 (Oct. 13, 1998) (mentioning that
Robert Johnson's estate has built up a reservoir of more than $1 million in royalties).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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phonorecords distributed before 1978 from the status of "published"
works.67 By drafting this amendment, Congress most likely intended to
overturn La Cienega and restore the law governing published works to the
status it had held under Rosette.68  Three years later, the Ninth Circuit's
decision in ABKCO attempted to resolve the circuit split and confirmed
Congress's 1997 amendment.69
III. ABKCO MusIc, INC. V. LA VERE 70
A. Factual Background
Robert Johnson helped pioneer the Delta blues, a form of music
popular in the 1930s that influenced many generations of musicians.71
Johnson also inspired some of the most popular and successful musicians
of all time, including Eric Clapton and the Rolling Stones.
72
Before his death in 1938, Johnson recorded twenty-nine songs during
two sessions, one in San Antonio, Texas in November of 1936 and one in
Dallas, Texas in June of 1937, including the songs "Love in Vain" and
"Stop Breakin' Down. ' 73  He subsequently released these recordings on
phonorecords in 1938 and 1939. 74 Neither Johnson nor his record label
attempted to register these musical works for federal copyright protection
in 1938 or 1939.
75
In 1969, the Rolling Stones released their own version of "Love in
Vain" on the album "Let it Bleed., 76  In 1972, the Rolling Stones also
67. Id. § 303(b) ("The distribution before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for
any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work embodied therein.").
68. 143 CONG. REC. S11, 301 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1997) (statement by Sen. Hatch)
("[O]vertumrning the La Cienega decision will restore national uniformity on this important issue
by confirming the wisdom of the custom and usage of the affected industries and of the Copyright
Office for nearly 100 years.").
69. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d 691-92.
70. 217 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2000).
71. See Robert Johnson, at http://www.blueflamecafe.com/RobertJohnson.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2001).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Janette Spencer-Davis, Release of Phonorecords Did Not Publish Underlying Songs,
CCH Business and Finance Group, at http://business.cch.com/trade-regulations/default.asp?
subframe=/trade regulations/news/07-21-00.htm (2000).
75. Court Rules Rolling Stones Illegally "Borrowed" Two Robert Johnson Tunes, at
http://www.infoculture.cbc.ca/archives/musop/musop_06282000_rollingstones.phtml (last
updated June 28, 2000).
76. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 686.
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released a song adapted from Johnson's "Stop Breakin' Down" on the
album "Exile on Main Street." 7 In May of 1970, the Rolling Stones'
record label, the predecessor of ABKCO Music, Inc., filed for copyright
registration for the musical work "Love in Vain., 78 In 1972, ABKCO filed
for copyright registration for the musical work "Stop Breakin' Down. 79
In 1974, a man named Stephen LaVere became interested in
Johnson's music.80 LaVere tracked down Carrie Thompson, who LaVere
understood was Johnson's only surviving heir.8' LaVere made a deal with
Thompson whereby she agreed to give LaVere her ownership rights to
Johnson's music in exchange for fifty percent of the royalties that LaVere
would accumulate from Johnson's musical works.8 2 LaVere subsequently
formed King of Spades Music to collect royalties from Johnson's songs.83
LaVere eventually assigned his copyright interests to the record label,
Mimosa, which later assigned the copyrights to another label, Delta Haze.84
In 1990, Columbia Records released a boxed set of Johnson's
complete recordings.85 Columbia, as well as some popular artists who used
Johnson's works, recognized the common law copyrights protecting
Johnson's works.8 6 However, ABKCO refused to do so. 87 In 1991, Delta
Haze filed for federal copyright registration for the Columbia release of
Johnson's complete recordings.88
B. The District Court Decision
In 1993, Delta Haze demanded that ABKCO stop using Johnson's
songs without permission or compensation. 9 In 1995, after years of
negotiations, Delta Haze threatened to sue ABKCO for copyright
infringement.90 Relying on La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top,91 ABKCO
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 686.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 686.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
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responded by filing an action for declaratory relief, arguing that Johnson's
songs were in the public domain as a result of their distribution and sale on
phonorecords in the 1930s without federal statutory copyright protection.92
Delta Haze counterclaimed, arguing that because Johnson never
technically published the disputed musical works, common law copyrights
protected them at the time the Rolling Stones released their versions.
93
Delta Haze also argued that they owned the copyrights to the two songs
"Love in Vain" and "Stop Breakin' Down," pursuant to filing copyright
notice and registration in 1991 on the Columbia release of Johnson's
musical works.94 Based on these claims, Delta Haze argued that ABKCO
did not own the songs.95
In 1997, while the ABKCO case was still pending in the district court,
Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 to declare that distribution of
phonorecords before 1978 did not constitute publication of the underlying
musical compositions. 96 Delta Haze contended that the amended version of
the Copyright Act of 1976 should control the district court's decision in
ABKCO, instead of La Cienega.
97
However, the district court granted ABKCO's motion for summary
judgment and denied Delta Haze's motion for summary judgment, holding
that La Cienega controlled the issue. The court ruled Johnson's two
songs were in the public domain at the time the Rolling Stones recorded
them. 99 Delta Haze appealed the district court's decision. 100
C. The Ninth Circuit Decision
On appeal, ABKCO argued that the amendment to the Copyright Act
did not apply because Congress passed the amendment while the district
court case was still pending. 10' ABKCO argued that because the case
began prior to the passage of the 1997 amendment to the Copyright Act,
the amendment should not apply retroactively to its case.1
0 2
92. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 686.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
97. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 687.
98. Id. at 686.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 687.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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1. Retroactivity
The Ninth Circuit closely examined the issue of retroactivity.10 3 The
court discussed whether Congress, through the amendment, intended to
change or merely to clarify the Copyright Act of 1909.14 The court
explained that if the amendment clarified the Act, then the District Court
did not err by applying the amendment retroactively in ABKCO.'05 If, on
the other hand, Congress intended the amendment to change the law, then
the amendment could not apply retroactively to the case without clearing
significant constitutional hurdles, and La Cienega would instead apply.
0 6
Delta Haze contended that the appellate court did not need to decide
the retroactivity issue because the 1997 amendment clearly allows no
exceptions to the rule that classifies phonorecords as unpublished works.
10 7
Delta Haze maintained that ABKCO's treatment of Johnson's songs as
published musical works was therefore a clear violation of the Act as
amended. 10 8 Delta Haze further claimed that even if retroactivity issues
were relevant to this case, the court should apply the amendment
retroactively because Congress intended it to clarify and not to actually
change the law.'09
ABKCO responded by claiming that the amendment should not apply
retroactively because it in fact constituted a change in the law." 0 ABKCO
reasoned that La Cienega was the prevailing law in the Ninth Circuit,I"
and that based on La Cienega, distribution of a phonorecord was a
publication of the underlying work.1 2 ABKCO further maintained that the
1997 amendment effectively changed this law by requiring that
phonorecords distributed before 1978 were not to be considered
publications of the underlying work. 113 ABKCO also argued that because
Congress failed to "clearly and unequivocally require retroactive
application,"1 4 the court should not apply the amendment retroactively.115
103. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 689-92.
104. Id. at 689-90.
105. Id. at 689.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 687.
108. See id. at 688.
109. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 687.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 686.
112. See id. at 689.
113. Id. at 690.
114. Id. at 691.
115. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
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The question of whether the 1997 amendment applied to ABKCO was
crucial. Even if the court determined that the amendment was the
prevailing law, superceding La Cienega, the court still might have decided
not to apply the amendment to this case because Congress passed the
amendment while the case was still pending." 6  The appellate court
decided this retroactivity issue primarily by determining whether Congress
intended that the amendment in question was to clarify the existing law or
actually to change it."
7
In analyzing the issue of retroactivity, the court disagreed with
ABKCO's contention that the amendment, by overturning La Cienega,
changed the law.11 8  The court reasoned that, while La Cienega was
controlling law in the Ninth Circuit at the time ABKCO filed the lawsuit,' 19
the Copyright Office and the music industry had always followed the rule
of Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing Corp.120 The court further
explained that La Cienega was merely an aberration that caused a split
between the Ninth and Second Circuits, ultimately leading Congress to
amend the Copyright Act of 1909 and resolve the split.12' Therefore, the
court explained, the amendment merely clarified the 1909 Act.
122
The court also disagreed with ABKCO's assertion that because
Congress did not expressly require retroactivity, the court should not have
implied it.' 23 The court reasoned that the 1997 amendment itself explicitly
referred to conduct occurring before Congress passed the amendment and,
therefore, applying the amendment only prospectively would not make
sense. 1
24
Finally, the court also relied on Mayhew v. Allsup, 25 a Sixth Circuit
decision concerning a similar problem, in which the Mayhew court
retroactively applied the 1997 amendment.1 26  Following Mayhew, the
ABKCO court agreed with Delta Haze's contention that retroactive
application of the 1997 amendment was appropriate. 27 After reviewing
numerous quotes from senators, representatives, and the House Report on
116. See id. at 689.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 691.
119. See id.
120. Id. (citing 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
121. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 166 F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 824.
127. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 692.
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the amendment, the court determined that Congress intended the
amendment to clarify rather than change the law.
128
Ultimately, the ABKCO court of appeals held that Johnson's songs
were not in fact published when they were distributed on phonorecords in
the 1930s.129 Accordingly, the two songs, "Love in Vain" and "Stop
Breakin' Down," never entered the public domain, and were thus not freely
available for use by the Rolling Stones in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
130
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Retroactivity Issue
1. ABKCO's First Argument: The 1997 Amendment Resulted in a Change
of the Law in the Ninth Circuit
ABKCO argued that the 1997 amendment actually changed the
law, 131 precluding the amendment's retroactive application. 32 ABKCO
argued that the 1997 amendment effectively changed the law in the Ninth
Circuit, because prior to the 1997 amendment, the law followed La
Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top,133 and the 1997 amendment expressly
overruled La Cienega.'34  The court responded to this argument by
claiming that the amendment clarified Congress' intentions before La
Cienega.3 5 However, the court's reasoning failed to answer the question
ABKCO presented.1
36
Contrary to the court's decision in ABKCO, ABKCO's assertion that
La Cienega was controlling law in the Ninth Circuit from 1995 until the
1997 amendment took effect was absolutely correct. The court attempted
to evade this reasoning by falling back on their "clarification argument,"
namely that it was wrong when it decided La Cienega, and was now
128. Id. at 691-92.
129. Id. at 692.
130. Id.
131. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 2000).
132. See Beverly Community Hosp. Ass'n. v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1997)
("If [the statute] were to be characterized [as a 'substantial change in the law'], its retroactive
application would pose a series of potential constitutional problems.").
133. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
134. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
135. Id.
136. See id.
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changing the law. 37 This tactic amounted to an attempt on the part of the
Ninth Circuit to act as if Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing Corp. 
138
was really the law in the Ninth Circuit during those years instead of La
Cienega.
The court claimed that La Cienega was merely an aberration-a
bump in the road that could be brushed aside.1 39 However, assuming that
La Cienega was incorrectly decided, the fact remains that La Cienega was
controlling case law in the Ninth Circuit from 1995 to 1997, and other
courts cited it as precedent in those years.'
40
Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion validly may claim that the
decision in La Cienega was wrong, its assertion that the 1997 amendment
did not change the law regarding publication in the Ninth Circuit"41 is
entirely unconvincing. In fact, the 1997 amendment flipped the law 180
degrees by deliberately overruling La Cienega 42 The court alluded to this
fact at the beginning of its reasoning on this issue when it admitted that
ABKCO's argument was "literally true."
143
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was further weakened by evidence that
La Cienega represented the majority position while Rosette represented the
minority. 144 The court implied that La Cienega was an irrational mistake of
judgment and asserted that Rosette was really the decision that represented
the intent of the framers of the 1909 Copyright Act. 45 However, a quick
look at the jurisprudential history of this issue before Rosette reveals that,
in fact, most courts felt that distribution and sale of phonorecords did
publish the underlying music. 46 The decision in Rosette actually appeared
to be more of a reflection of the intent of the music industry than anything
137. See id.
138. 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
139. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
140. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)
(stating that the La Cienega decision properly rejected the rule outlined in Rosette).
141. SeeABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
142. H.R. REP. No. 105-325, at 5 (1997) (stating that § 303(b) reverses the La Cienega
decision and affirms in the Copyright Act that a phonorecord released before 1978 did not
constitute a "publication" under the 1909 Copyright Act).
143. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
144. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 ("Rosette is the minority rule; our research fails to reveal
any other circuit which has followed it.").
145. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691 ("It is evident that Congress believed La Cienega was
aberrational, that Rosette was the accepted and controlling interpretation, and that § 303(b) was
enacted to make this clear.").
146. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 ("The majority of district courts considering this question
have adopted ZZ Top's view [that distribution of phonorecords before 1978 constituted
publication of the underlying work].").
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else. 147
2. ABKCO's Second Argument: Congress Did Not Intend the 1997
Amendment to Apply Retroactively
ABKCO argued that because Congress did not expressly require the
1997 amendment to apply retroactively to cases pending on the date of its
enactment, the ABKCO court had no power to imply a retroactive
application. 148  The court's reasoning in response simply confused the
issue. The court explained that because the amendment specifically
referred to past conduct in regulating distribution of phonorecords before
1978, Congress obviously intended the amendment to apply
retroactively.
149
The court's entire discussion of the issue (whether the amendment
clarified the law or changed the law) completely missed the point. In its
attempt to apply the statute retroactively, 150 the court confused the
retroactivity issue with the substantive law. The time frame provided in the
statute 151 and the actual application of the statute are two entirely different
frames of reference. Here, the statute explicitly regulates works of art
produced before 1978.152 However, to which cases the statute should apply
was a separate issue. 153
Under the court's logic, the amendment only should have applied to
cases brought before 1978. 15 If this were the situation, the amendment
would not have applied to ABKCO.155 Based on the language of the statute,
Congress did not intend this result. '5 6 The date to which the statute referred
would not address the question of retroactive or prospective application of
that law unless the statute made that explicitly clear. 57 The amendment
explicitly states that the date in question (January 1, 1978) refers to the date
that applies to the subject of the statute (when the phonorecords in question
147. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][4] ("The heart of the difficulty that surrounds
the issue of publication ... may be found in the business practice of the music industry.").
148. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
149. Id. (citing Mayhew, 166 F.3d 821).
150. See generally id. at 687-92.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
152. Id.
153. 1 NtMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7] n.101.1 ("The question is not whether the
amendment casts the long-ago acts of distribution in a new light; rather, it is whether infringing
conduct, to be actionable under the 1997 amendment, can pre-date its enactment.").
154. Id. (citing Mayhew, 166 F.3d 821).
155. See id.
156.17 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
157. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7] n.101.1.
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were distributed) and not to the application of the statute itself.'58
Evidence that Congress deliberately intended the statute to apply
prospectively further undermines the court's argument for applying the
statute retroactively. The court evidently failed to examine the notes
following the statute because had it done so, it would have found the words
"effective on enactment"'159 following the statute in the notes.160  These
words are unequivocal evidence that Congress intended the statute to take
effect only after the statute passed.161  Had Congress intended for the
statute to apply to pre-enactment actions, or actions pending as of the
enactment, it could easily have included such words in the Act itself or in
the notes following the Act.162 The absence of any language suggesting a
retroactive application of the law indicates that Congress only wanted to
apply the law prospectively.
163
Furthermore, in examining the legislative history of the enactment of
the amendment, the court missed an earlier version of the bill that also
provided that its effective date would be the date of its enactment.' 64 This
earlier bill included language to indicate that prospective enforcement of
the statute was intentional, and Congress contemplated such language from
the beginning of the legislative process. 
1 65
Additionally, language contained in a separate but related bill
1 66
clearly applied to Congress' intent to ensure prospective enforcement of
copyright infringement statutes. 67 The court's lengthy discussion of the
difference between amendments that clarified existing statutes and
amendments that actually changed the law was irrelevant and lacking a
diligent legislative analysis. This discussion also misrepresented Congress'
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 303.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. HR. 1967, 105th Cong. § 2 (1st sess. 1997).
165. See id.; see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05 n.96.
166. Copyright Term Extension Act, H.R. 1621, 105th Cong. § 5(b) (1997). The act
ultimately became the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 4.05 n.96.
167. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05 n.96.
The bill also provided that it would not apply to "any action pending on the date of
enactment in any court in which a party, prior to the date of enactment, sought
dismissal of, judgment on, or declaratory relief regarding a claim of infringement
by arguing that the adverse party had no valid copyright in a musical work by virtue
of the distribution of phonorecords embodying it."
Id. (quoting H.R. 1621, 105th Cong. § 5(b) (1997)).
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intent, and was therefore misleading.
B. Publication
1. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.168 Confused the
Publication Issue
If the White-Smith Court had possessed the foresight to realize that
mechanical reproductions of music would soon become a commonplace
medium, it may have ruled differently. Unfortunately, the court
erroneously applied rules created for written works of art to a medium that
involved sound. 1
69
White-Smith repeatedly emphasized that the existing copyright statute
protected tangible works of art, and not intangible works. 70  The court
reasoned that the sounds of musical notes, when reproduced mechanically,
were intangible and thus not copyrightable.'
7'
The White-Smith Court clearly did not understand the new
technology. Neither party argued that the mere sounds of music
themselves were copyrightable. 172  The argument, rather, concerned
whether piano rolls represented legitimate copies of the underlying
music. 173 The court failed to realize that piano rolls are tangible products,
just as sheet music or books are tangible products. 174 A piano roll, like a
phonorecord, is a medium that reproduced the artist's work-in this case
the artist's work was music. 175 This is arguably no different from a book
that reproduced a literary artist's work-in that case the artist's work was a
story.
Before writing was developed, when stories were passed on from
person to person by memory, the stories themselves were intangible
products because they were not stored in a physical medium. 76 However,
most people would agree that a book represents a copy of the underlying
168. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
169. Id. at 3 ("This court [is] adopting [the] definition of the subject of property in a book or
literary composition as being 'the order of the words in the author's composition.' And the same
thing must also be true as to the notes of a musical composition.").
170. Id. at 7.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 12.
173. Id. at 11.
174. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 12.
175. See generally id. at 1.
176. See Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
afq'd, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
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story embodied in paper and ink. It would be absurd for a court to hold
that, because a book reproduces an intangible product (a story), it does not
constitute a copy of that product. The reasoning in White-Smith with
respect to phonorecords is similarly weak. A phonorecord is just as much a
tangible product of the underlying musical work as a book is a tangible
product of the underlying literary work. 177  Both products store an
intangible work of art in a physical medium.1
78
White-Smith also ignored the fundamental difference between literary
compositions and audible musical compositions. 79 Literary compositions
are perceived with the eyes, while audible musical compositions are
perceived with the ears.180 An audible copy of a musical work of art (e.g.,
that which is embodied in a piano roll or a phonorecord) must be heard to
be determined a copy, while a copy of a literary work of art must be seen to
be determined a copy.' 81 It logically follows that a piano roll, which
reproduced the sound of the original musical work, was a legitimate and
tangible copy of that original work.
By applying the standard for determining copyright infringement of
literary works to musical works,1 82 the White-Smith court made a fatal
mistake. This misunderstanding led to almost a century of confusion and
conflict over the issue of publication. 83 The resulting interpretation of the
White-Smith opinion was that if phonorecords, like piano rolls, were not
considered copies of the original work, then their distribution could not
have constituted a publication of such work.1
84
2. Rosette Contravened the Constitutional Monopoly Limitation
The Rosette decision encouraged artists to delay copyrighting their
musical works by allowing the artists to profit from their work's release on
phonorecords, without a requirement that the artists properly give notice
and register for federal copyright protection in exchange for this profit.
185
Rosette offered the artists no incentive to comply with the Copyright Act
by giving notice and registering their works for federal copyright
177. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 11.
178. See id. at 14.
179. See id. at 5.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Id. at 12-14.
182. See id. at 1.
183. See, e.g., ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 688.
184. Id.
185. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953.
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protection. 186
According to the rule established in Rosette, an artist could distribute
music on phonorecords or other recording media to millions of people for
profit, while retaining protection over the composition as an "unpublished"
work. 187 By delaying "publication," the artist could effectively extend the
profits and monopoly of the work longer than if the artist had complied
with the original Copyright Act requirements. 188 This result would defeat
the purpose of the Copyright Act, namely, that copyrights should be an
agreement between the artist and the government to give the artist a
monopoly for a limited time, followed by the release of the work to the
public for the benefit of society.' 
89
Rosette allowed artists to take advantage of a loophole in the law and
to reap extraordinary profits at the expense of the public.' 90 Although the
Rosette court acknowledged the potential problems their ruling
presented, 191 they claimed that such a ruling was necessary because it was
consistent with the common practice in the music industry. 92  The court
claimed that the music industry did not consider distribution and sale of
phonorecords to constitute publication of the underlying work. 93 Rosette
demonstrated the same music industry influence on copyright law 194 as did
the 1997 amendment and ABKCO.
Clearly, the music industry desperately wanted to hold on to the
Rosette definition of publication because it benefited the industry
significantly. By allowing artists (and their record labels) to distribute and
sell millions of records without first obtaining statutory copyright
protection, Congress and ABKCO effectively extended the length of time
within which artists could claim a monopoly on the benefits from their
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1950)
("The Copyright Act grants a monopoly only under limited conditions. If plaintiff's argument
[that distribution and sale of phonorecords does not constitute a publication of the underlying
composition] is to succeed here, then a perpetual monopoly is granted without the necessity of
compliance with the Copyright Act.").
189. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.01[B].
190. See La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953. See generally Rosette, 546 F.2d 461.
191. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1189 (admitting that "there is distaste for the perpetual
monopoly that sustaining common law rights unlimited in time involves").
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("'[T]he Rosette opinion is a creative attempt to deal with the problem of industry practice
in such a manner as to save a great number of musical compositions from the public domain."'
(quoting I NIMMER § 4.05[B][2] n.30)).
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work.1 95 As a direct result, changes in this law immediately awarded
enormous profits to the music industry.
196
The Rosette view of publication translated into tremendous wealth for
the music industry as a whole. 197 Thus, it is not surprising that the music
industry levied substantial pressure on the government whenever someone
challenged its favored definition of "publication."'1 98 The district court in
Rosette acknowledged this pressure when it stated that "the practicing
copyright bar has voiced its objection to relinquishing what they consider
stare decisis .... "1 99
However, the problem with Rosette is that just because the practice of
profiting from distributed phonorecords without federal statutory copyright
protection is a common one in the industry does not make it good public
policy. In upholding this practice, the Rosette court essentially proclaimed,
"we know this is wrong, but given that it has been going on for so long, we
will allow it to continue., 200 Rosette did not solve the problem of allowing
artists to unfairly extend the limited monopolies on their works, but rather
passed the buck to the next court to hear the same problem. 20 1 The holding
in Rosette prevents the public from using these artists' works for a longer
period of time. Therefore, the Rosette holding is against public policy.
The Rosette case referred to the Universal Copyright Convention's
("UCC") definition of publication, which held that publication is "the
reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution to the public of
copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually
perceived., 20 2 The Rosette court further stated that the UCC agreed on this
definition so as not to conflict with U.S. copyright law.203 Essentially,
Rosette employed a circuitous method of defining publication similar to the
U.S. Copyright Act.2 4
195. See generally Shapiro, 91 F. Supp. at 475 ("The Copyright Act grants a monopoly only
under limited conditions. If plaintiffs argument [that distribution and sale of phonorecords does
not constitute a publication of the underlying composition] is to succeed here, then a perpetual
monopoly is granted without the necessity of compliance with the Copyright Act.").
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7].
199. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1189.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also ARPAD BOGSCH, UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION, AN ANALYSIS
AND COMMENTARY 83 (1958) ("It was believed that a contrary provision in the Convention
would require an amendment of the U.S. Copyright Statute unlikely to be accepted by
Congress.").
204. BOGSCH, supra note 203, at 83-84.
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Rosette invoked the UCC definition to lend more credence to its
publication theory.205 Rosette claimed that because a phonorecord did not
allow one to "read or otherwise visually perceiv[e]" the underlying work of
art, a phonorecord did not constitute a "copy" of the underlying work, as
defined by the UCC. 20 6 Therefore, the underlying work of art embodied in
a phonorecord could not be "published" by the distribution and sale of that
phonorecord. °7
Rosette's argument fails, in part, because of its reliance on the flawed
definition of "publication" in White-Smith.20 8  Rosette's assertion that
phonorecords were not "copies" of the underlying musical composition,
and thus were not copyrightable, stemmed from White-Smith's theory that
phonorecords were merely reproductions of live performances of the
underlying work.20 9 Rosette held that because live performances were not
copyrightable, phonorecords were not copyrightable either.21 °
3. ABKCO's Interpretation of Publication
In its decision in ABKCO, the Ninth Circuit relied on the theory that
La Cienega conflicted with the settled expectations of the Copyright Office
and the music industry. 21' Therefore, the ABKCO court intended to
confirm the intent of Congress and restore uniformity to this area of the
law.212  Through interpretation of statements made by members of
Congress regarding the 1997 amendment, the court also implied that
Rosette represented the "settled law" in this area.21 3 However, nothing
could be further from the truth.
On the contrary, La Cienega was the majority rule, representing the
common knowledge of what constituted publication, 214 and the Second
205. 354 F. Supp. at 1189.
206. Id. (alteration in original).
207. Id.
208. See Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1189. See generally White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1.
209. See generally White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1.
210. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1189.
211. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 690-91; see also 143 CONG. REc. S11, 301 (daily ed. Oct.
28, 1997) (statement by Sen. Hatch) ("Overturning the La Cienega decision will restore national
uniformity on this important issue by confirming the wisdom of the custom and usage of the
affected industries and of the Copyright Office for nearly 100 years.").
212. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691-92.
213. Id. at 690 ("' [La Cienega overturned] a long-time understanding of copyright law
[which] has been ratified and reaffirmed by the Second Circuit. The La Cienega decision took
that settled law [of Rosette] and cast it on its head."' (quoting 143 CONG. REC. H9882 (1997)
(statement by Rep. Berman))).
214. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 ("[T]he relatively few courts which considered the question
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Circuit's decision in Rosette was the minority rule.215  Rosette took a
backseat primarily because the Rosette court lacked stable reasoning in
holding that distribution and sale of phonorecords was not considered to be
a "publication" of the underlying musical compositions embodied
therein.216 The Rosette court based its decision on the assumption that
phonorecords were not copies of the underlying music. 21 7 This assumption
stemmed from the fact that phonorecords were so new when Congress
passed the 1909 Ace 18 that legislators and judges did not fully understand
how to define them.2 19 Instead of classifying them as copies of the
underlying music, Rosette, along with other courts, followed White-Smith's
lead and classified phonorecords as "frozen performances" that did not
220warrant copyright protection.
Unfortunately, because record companies potentially could have lost a
tremendous amount of money under La Cienega, their pressure may have
motivated Congress' 1997 amendment overturning that decision.221 This
same pressure from the music industry also may have influenced the
ABKCO court's decision to confirm the 1997 amendment. However, for
legal and public policy reasons, La Cienega should have been upheld as
good law.
4. Public Policy from White-Smith to La Cienega
In the early years of the twentieth century, phonorecords were
relatively novel and not widely distributed.222 Record labels primarily
were almost unanimous in determining that public sale or other distribution of phonorecords does
constitute a publication and hence a divestment of common law rights in the works recorded."
(quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B])).
215. Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[W]e are
aware that Rosette is not without its critics and is not followed by a majority of district courts in
other circuits ...."). Note that Jones was decided by the same court that handed down the
Rosette decision. See id.
216. See Tempo Music, 838 F. Supp. at 171 ("'[T]he Rosette opinion is a creative attempt to
deal with the problem of industry practice in such a manner as to save a great number of musical
compositions from the public domain."' (quoting 1 NIMMER § 4.05[B][2] n.30)).
217. See Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193.
218. 143 CONG. REC. H9882 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Frank) ("When the
phrase 'phonorecords' first went into the law in 1909, there were not very many because they
were too new.").
219. See generally White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1.
220. See Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1190-91 (citing several cases that independently followed
the decision of White-Smith).
221. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7] ("In response to that 1995 ruling [in La
Cienega], affected songwriters lobbied Congress for an amendment to the Copyright Act.").
222. See supra text accompanying note 218.
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223distributed music by printing the notes to a song on sheets of paper.
Actual phonorecords sold relatively poorly at the time,224 presumably
because the medium was so new.
Today, the opposite is true. Phonorecord sales, including compact
discs and audiotapes, vastly outstrip sheet music sales.225 Therefore, public
policy considerations point towards upholding La Cienega. Because of the
decline in the sale of sheet music and the rise in the sale of phonorecords
over the years since the White-Smith decision,226 it makes much more sense
to begin applying the La Cienega interpretation of what constitutes
publication. La Cienega took a realistic, practical, and (most importantly)
contemporary view of the publication issue in light of the current methods
of disseminating music to the public.227
Instead of relying on a decision from over ninety years ago, when
mechanical reproductions of music were in their infancy, courts should rely
on a more recent decision that reviewed over ninety years of the music
industry's abuse of the antiquated publication law.228 The La Cienega
court understood the implications of allowing artists to profit from the
distribution and sale of their phonorecords without first obtaining statutory
copyright protection, then later allowing the artist to apply for statutory
protection to extend their monopoly on the profits from their work.229
White-Smith should no longer be followed, because the decision emerged at
a time when the medium of phonorecords was so new to the country that
the concept of the medium, 230 and therefore the definition of it, was
misunderstood.
The very words by which the UCC defined publication demonstrated
this misunderstanding. 23' The fact that a work had to be "read or otherwise
visually perceived" 232 to constitute a copy of the original belies the fact that
sound reproductions were relatively unheard of, both literally and
figuratively.233 Today, after a century of familiarity with phonorecords and
similar media, and with society's understanding that these phonorecords
223. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][4].
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See generally La Cienega, 53 F.3d 950.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 953.
230. Shapiro, 91 F. Supp. at 475 ("Modem recording has made possible the preservation
and reproduction of sound which theretofore had disappeared immediately upon its creation.").
231. See BOGSCH, supra note 203, at 81.
232. See id.
233. Shapiro, 91 F. Supp. at 475.
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are tangible copies of the underlying intangible work, it is difficult to argue
that distribution of these forms of art does not constitute publication.234
The 1976 Copyright Act recognized that the distribution and sale of a
phonorecord published the underlying work.235 A contradiction therefore
exists. Whereas Congress now acknowledges that distribution of
phonorecords logically constitutes a publication of the underlying work, it
is unwilling to apply this rule to pre-1978 recordings.236
Distribution and sale of literary works clearly constitutes publication,
so why should pre-1978 musical works be treated differently? Courts
recognize that when an artist distributes and sells millions of phonorecords,
a publication has taken place.237 The ABKCO decision suggests that pre-
1978 artists, who were lucky enough to get away with selling millions of
albums without ever having to register for federal copyright protection, are
entitled to a windfall of epic proportions. 8
It is fundamentally unfair to contemporary artists to provide this
enormous benefit to pre-1978 artists. This demonstrates an unequal
application of copyright law. Essentially, this is no different than allowing
an artist to distribute and sell millions of copies of sheet music without
obtaining federal statutory copyright protection, and then further allowing
that artist to prevent others from using that sheet music in their own
works.239 Pre-1978 artists benefit from the ABKCO decision and the 1997
amendment, while post-1978 artists do not.240 Congress has effectively
singled out a specific group of people (post-1978 artists) and placed a
substantial burden on them by not allowing them to profit from their work
to the same extent as pre-1978 artists.
24 1
In addition to the injury to the post-1978 artists, the public is also
injured. The extended copyright protection set forth in the 1997
amendment and affirmed by the ABKCO decision denies the public its right
234. Id. ("When phonograph records of a musical composition are available for purchase in
every city, town and hamlet, certainly the dissemination of the composition to the public is
complete, and is as complete as by sale of a sheet music reproduction of the composition.").
235. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
237. See, e.g., Shapiro, 91 F. Supp. at 475 ("It seems to me that publication is a practical
question and does not rest on any technical definition of the word 'copy."').
238. See generally ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 692 (explaining that § 303(b) applies retroactively,
which effectively allows artists to maintain a monopoly that exceeds the usual statutory period).
239. Shapiro, 91 F. Supp. at 475 ("It seems to me that production and sale of a phonograph
record is fully as much a publication as production and sale of sheet music. I can see no practical
distinction between the two. If one constitutes an abandonment, so should the other.").
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b).
241. See id.
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under the U.S. Constitution 242 to benefit from the use of these works.
C. The 1997 Amendment to the Copyright Act is Unconstitutional
In enacting the 1997 amendment, which was intended to uphold
Rosette,243 Congress gave pre-1978 artists much more protection than
Rosette originally did.2" Because the 1997 amendment is overinclusive
and underinclusive, it may be unconstitutional.245 If so, the ABKCO
decision, which relies primarily on the 1997 amendment,246 should not
stand as precedent. La Cienega, which both the 1997 amendment and
ABKCO struck down, could therefore be restored to its rightful position as
controlling law.
The 1997 amendment may be underinclusive because it refers solely
to musical works embodied in phonorecords.247 However, other works,
such as literary or dramatic readings, are also recorded and distributed on
phonorecords.248 Because the 1997 amendment only refers to musical
works, these phonorecords of other works fall outside the relatively narrow
scope of the statute, and presumably enter the public domain under the
majority rule outlined in La Cienega.
249
Congress' focus on the copyrights of musical works embodied on
phonorecords and its exclusion of any mention of the copyrights of literary
or dramatic works embodied on phonorecords demonstrates the tremendous
lobbying power of the music industry. 250  Congress claimed that the
distribution of phonorecords before 1978 did not constitute a publication of
the underlying musical work.251 It is notable that Congress did not apply
this rule to dramatic and literary works recorded on phonorecords.252 The
issue of publication by phonorecord distribution should not be limited only
to musical works.
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." (emphasis supplied)).
243. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
244. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7].
245. See id.
246. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
247. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
248. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7].
249. See id.
250. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b).
251. Id.
252. See id.
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Congress' original rationale, outlined in Rosette and in the La
Cienega dissent, was that phonorecords were merely performances of the
underlying musical compositions, and thus not copyrightable. 53 Using this
reasoning, the question then becomes whether literary or dramatic works
recorded on phonorecords are performances. There is no difference
between a literary or dramatic performance and a musical performance for
purposes of the publication issue.254 All three are intangible works stored
as sound recordings embodied on a tangible product-a phonorecord.2
The fact that Congress excluded other forms of art that are also embodied
in phonorecords suggests that the statute is underinclusive 6
The 1997 amendment may also be overinclusive because it uses the
words "for any purpose. 257 Congress indicated several times that it was
enacting the amendment to overturn La Cienega and to restore Rosette to a
controlling position. 258 However, by using such broad language in the
1997 amendment, Congress may have exceeded the scope of the Rosette
decision and the La Cienega dissent by offering more protection to artists
than those decisions intended. 9  Consequently, Congress may have
accomplished the opposite of what the Rosette opinion and the La Cienega
dissent intended.26°
The district court in Rosette wanted to prevent common law
copyrights from exceeding the rights of federal statutory copyright
owners. 261 The court reasoned that it was not fair to allow artists to
distribute and sell phonorecords, thereby earning a profit, without the
burden of providing notice to others of the artists' common law copyright
262interests.
The court pointed out that federal statutory copyright holders, unlike
common law copyright holders, are punished for not providing notice
according to the provision in the statute which states "any failure to file
such notice shall be a complete defense to any suit, action or proceeding for
253. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 955 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193.
254. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
255. See id.
256. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05 [B][7].
257. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999) ("The distribution before January 1, 1978, of a
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work embodied
therein.") (emphasis added).
258. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
259. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05[B][7].
260. See id.
261. See Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1192.
262. Id.
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any infringement of such copyright., 263 Therefore, the Rosette court ruled
that once a phonorecord is sold, the artist who fails to properly give notice
and register the work with a federal statutory copyright should not be able
to assert common law copyright interests in the work against unauthorized
use of the composition unless and until the artist later gives notice and
registers the work for federal statutory copyright protection.2 64
The 1997 amendment, while presumably attempting to restore the law
to its status as outlined in Rosette,265 actually produced the opposite effect
of the rule intended by the Rosette opinion.266 By using the words "for any
purpose, 267 the 1997 amendment gives artists much more protection than
they previously had, because it allows artists to continue distributing and
selling music without any requirement that they file for federal statutory
copyright protection. 268  Thus, the Rosette ruling-that artists who sell
uncopyrighted phonorecords should not be allowed to enforce common law
copyright interests against unauthorized infringers 269 -is ironically
overturned by the very statute that was enacted to uphold it.27° The 1997
amendment is therefore overinclusive.
The 1997 amendment also contradicts a similar holding in the
dissenting opinion of La Cienega.271 The La Cienega dissent expressed a
concern that an artist who does not register his work for federal statutory
copyright protection may be able to "artfully extend the time during which
he can exploit his work., 272  An artist could do this by significantly
delaying the time when he gave notice and registered for federal statutory
protection, thereby receiving common law protection while he reaped
profits from the sale of his phonorecords.273 If the artist decided to apply
for federal statutory copyright protection, the artist would then receive
additional protection of his work for the same amount of time as another
artist who applied for the federal statutory protection immediately after
distributing her work.274
263. Id. (quoting section 1 (e) of the 1909 Copyright Act).
264. Id.
265. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 691.
266. See id.
267. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
268. See id.
269. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193.
270. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b).
271. SeeLa Cienega, 53 F.3d at 955.
272. Id.
273. ld. at 953.
274. Id.
[U]nder Rosette, an artist who does not so comply [with the 1909 Copyright Act's
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Therefore, the artist could potentially have extended the duration of
copyright protection on his work by utilizing both common law and federal
statutory copyright protections, ultimately extending the duration of the
monopoly on the profits and other benefits from his work.27 5 The 1997
amendment expressly allows this extension of the artist's monopoly, which
is in opposition to the Rosette decision and the La Cienega dissent.276
Thus, the 1997 amendment is also overinclusive because it allows artists to
benefit from the distribution and sale of their phonorecords without
requiring them to file for federal statutory copyright protection.277
V. CONCLUSION
ABKCO v. LaVere278 confirmed a statutory amendment that Congress
never should have passed.279 The amendment was meant to clarify an issue
that had been in dispute for over ninety years.280 However, instead of
resolving the problem, the ABKCO decision only exacerbated it. Most
people want to see artists rewarded for their efforts by granting them the
limited monopoly that the Constitution guarantees them.2 81  However,
when artists begin to use loopholes in the law to extend this monopoly at
the expense of the general public, it is time for reform. Unfortunately, at a
time when resolution of this problem is becoming increasingly important,
the ABKCO decision implicitly approved of and furthered this practice. 82
The 1909 Copyright Act did not adequately define publication in
regard to phonorecords.283 This is because phonorecords were so new at
notice and registration requirements] can sell any number of recordings for several
years, receiving common law copyright protection all the while, before
copyrighting the work with the Copyright Office. From the point of this late
compliance on, the statutory copyright owner receives 28 years of federal
protection.
Id.
275. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 ("Rosette consequently may encourage artists to delay
compliance with the Copyright Act's requirements and thereby receive 'longer' copyright
protection. Such an outcome would clearly be undesirable.").
276. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1999).
277. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1 § 4.05 [B][7].
278. 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000).
279. See id. at 692.
280. 143 CONG. REC. Sll, 301 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1997).
281. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
282. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 692.
283. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.04 n.5 ("Apparently a definition of publication was
intentionally omitted because of the difficulty of defining the term with respect to works of art
where no copies are reproduced.").
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the time that the concept was foreign to many lawmakers.284 The music
industry saw a golden opportunity to extend copyright protection over the
works in which they had a vested interest, and jumped on it.285 Over the
years, music industry lobbyists have kept the pressure on the Copyright
Office, the courts, and Congress to continue extending the copyright
interests of artists with pre-1978 phonorecords.286 The very fact that
Congress has recognized for more than twenty years that phonorecord
distribution constitutes publication illustrates the problem with the ABKCO
decision.287 Artists who distributed phonorecords before 1978 should not
be treated differently than those who distributed phonorecords after 1978.
This gives pre-1978 artists an unfair advantage.
Robert Johnson has been dead for more than sixty years. 288 While it
is undisputed that Johnson has had a profound influence on several
generations of musicians,289 there is quite a bit of disagreement over
whether his successors should still be reaping such enormous benefits from
his work.29° It is not fair to punish the Rolling Stones for using a Robert
Johnson song that they legitimately and understandably believed to be in
the public domain.291 By allowing Johnson's successors in interest to
maintain control over his songs more than sixty years after his death, the
ABKCO court is frustrating the purpose of the Constitution.292
The whole idea behind copyright law is that the artist will have a
limited monopoly, and the work will thereafter become available to the
293 Jono'public for use. In Johnson's case, his works were not afforded federal
statutory protection until 1991, more than fifty years after the initial
distribution of his phonorecords.294 With federal statutory protection newly
obtained, the works will be kept from the public until well into the middle
295of the twenty-first century.
The combination of common-law and federal statutory copyright
protection serve to provide LaVere's assignees with more than 100 years of
284. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 688.
285. See I NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.05 [B][7].
286. See id.
287. See Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1192 n.8.
288. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 686.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 685.
292. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
293. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.03.
294. ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 686.
295. See id. at 685 n.1.
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monopolization of the benefits derived from Johnson's works.296 The
framers of the Constitution surely never envisioned such a windfall, and it
hardly seems consistent with the purpose of copyright law. 297  It is thus
difficult to imagine a good reason why Congress and ABKCO bestowed
such a sweeping benefit upon a particular class of people.
The Ninth Circuit made the right decision the first time around in La
Cienega v. ZZ Top.298 It is unfortunate that Congress' 1997 amendment
and the ABKCO decision overturned La Cienega.299 Hopefully some day
lawmakers will once again change the copyright laws to reflect a public
policy that rewards all artists equally while simultaneously giving the
public a reasonable opportunity to benefit from such works.
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